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The GrowTh in ApplicATions for sociAl securiTy 
DisAbiliTy insurAnce: A spillover effecT from 
workers’ compensATion
by Xuguang (Steve) Guo and John F. Burton, Jr.*
We investigate the determinants of application for Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) benefits in approxi-
mately 45 jurisdictions between 1981 and 1999. We reproduce findings of previous studies of the determinants of 
DI application then test the additional influence of changes to workers’ compensation program benefits and rules 
on DI application rates. Our findings indicate that the programs are interrelated: When workers’ compensation 
benefits declined and eligibility rules tightened in the 1990s, the DI application rate increased. 
Introduction
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) is the largest 
income-replacement program for nonelderly Ameri-
cans. The federal DI and Medicare programs provide 
cash benefits and health care coverage to disabled 
beneficiaries until they return to work, die, or qualify 
for Social Security old-age benefits. The number of DI 
beneficiaries dramatically increased in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, which drew considerable attention from 
policymakers and academics. As Chart 1 shows, only 
about 2.3 percent of adults aged 25–64 were DI recipi-
ents in the 1980s, but the figure grew to 3.5 percent 
by 1999.
Previous Studies
Studies investigating the rise of DI enrollment primar-
ily focus on the incentives to apply. The factors that 
produce these incentives fall into three categories: 
(1) the supply of DI benefits, (2) the demand for DI 
benefits, and (3) the effects of alternative income 
replacement programs. DI supply is determined 
by program rules, including the stringency of the 
eligibility criteria and the generosity of benefits. 
The demand for DI benefits is largely determined by 
individuals’ characteristics, including health status 
and financial needs. Alternative programs that also 
pay cash benefits or cover medical costs for disabled 
persons (or did so during the 1980s and 1990s) include 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC), Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families (TANF), and Medicaid.
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TTD temporary total disability
WCPD workers’ compensation permanent disability
* Xuguang (Steve) Guo is Assistant Professor in the College of Business and Economics at University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. John F. 
Burton, Jr. is Professor Emeritus in the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers: The State University of New Jersey and 
Professor Emeritus in the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University.
This article was prepared with support from the Department of Education’s National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research  
through the Cornell University Rehabilitation Research and Training Center.
Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted; any items may be reprinted, but citation of the Social Security Bulletin as the 
source is requested. To view the Bulletin online, visit our website at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy. The findings and conclusions 
presented in the Bulletin are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Social Security Administration, the 
Department of Education, or the Cornell Rehabilitation Research and Training Center.
PERSPECTIVES
2 http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy
Autor and Duggan (2003) claim that liberalizing the 
application screening process has been a major cause 
of the growth in DI application since the early 1980s. 
Chart 2 shows that the application rate—measured 
as DI applicants per 100,000 workers—was gener-
ally higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s. According 
to Duggan and Autor (2006), the Social Security 
Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 significantly 
altered the DI eligibility criteria because it allowed 
relatively subjective evidence based on an applicant’s 
reported pain and discomfort in lieu of strictly objec-
tive medical evidence. In addition, the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) was directed to relax its strict 
screening criteria for mental illness and to consider 
multiple nonsevere ailments in establishing eligibility. 
Mashaw and Reno (1996b) argued that the “liberaliza-
tion” of the eligibility criteria in the 1984 legislation 
remedied overly zealous administrative retrenchment 
during 1979–1983. Moreover, they found that, despite 
the growth in DI enrollment in the 1990s, the DI 
allowance rate (after controlling for changes in the 
workforce’s age and sex distributions) did not return to 
the peak reached in 1975. The authors concluded that 
disabled individuals had less access to DI benefits in 
the 1990s than in the 1970s. Chart 2 shows that the DI 
acceptance ratio—the number of benefit allowances 
divided by the number of denials—generally increased 
from 1981 to 1992, then dropped until the mid-1990s, 
before rising again after 1995.1
Individuals with disabilities are more likely to 
seek assistance from social insurance programs in an 
economic downturn than they are in a robust economy. 
Most empirical studies support this prediction (Autor 
and Duggan 2003; Kreider 1999; Rupp and Stapleton 
1995). The unemployment rate is usually positively 
correlated with DI application. Soss and Keiser (2006) 
provide evidence that a state’s disability prevalence 
rate is a factor in DI application rates. They find that as 
the disability prevalence rate increased by 1 percentage 
point between 1991 and 1993, the DI application rate 
increased by 15.4 per 10,000 residents. The disability 
prevalence rate increases substantially as the popula-
tion ages. Rupp and Stapleton (1995) estimate that 
population growth and aging between 1988 and 1992 
accounted for a 1.3 percent average annual increase in 
DI applications. Strand (2002) reveals that women are 
more likely to apply for DI benefits than men are.
Despite decades of studies, researchers have largely 
ignored one important aspect of DI: its relationship 
with workers’ compensation. This lack of scholarly 
attention is particularly striking because the connec-
tion between the programs has long been of concern to 
policymakers in state legislatures and in Congress.
DI (in conjunction with Medicare) is the larg-
est source of cash and medical benefits for workers 
with disabilities in the United States, and workers’ 
compensation is the second largest source (Sengupta, 
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Reno, and Burton 2011, 2). Workers’ compensation 
and DI serve overlapping, although not identical, 
populations.2 Both programs provide medical and 
cash benefits to workers with chronic, severely dis-
abling conditions.
Many workers’ compensation claimants have 
persistent health problems that may eventually also 
qualify for DI benefit (Baldwin and Johnson 1998; 
Butler, Johnson, and Baldwin 1995; Mashaw and 
Reno 1996a). As of December 2010, 13.5 percent of DI 
beneficiaries had at some time also received work-
ers’ compensation (or public disability) benefits, and 
7.1 percent were current recipients (Sengupta, Reno, 
and Burton 2011, Table 17).
Workers’ Compensation in the 1990s
This article examines the effects of workers’ com-
pensation program changes on the DI application rate 
during the 1990s. Each state has a workers’ compen-
sation program that provides cash benefits, medical 
care, and rehabilitation benefits to workers disabled 
by work-related injuries and diseases. There are no 
federal standards for workers’ compensation and state 
rules differ considerably on level of benefits, cover-
age of employers and employees, and eligibility for 
benefits.3 Workers’ compensation is thus very different 
from DI, for which coverage rules for employers and 
workers, eligibility requirements, and benefit levels are 
determined at the national level.
Workers’ compensation is the only significant 
civilian disability income program, either private or 
public, that pays benefits to partially or totally disabled 
workers.4 However, the criteria used by state work-
ers’ compensation programs to determine whether a 
worker is totally disabled differ from those used by 
SSA for the DI program. Moreover, it is possible for an 
injured worker to be found partially disabled by a state 
workers’ compensation program but totally disabled 
by SSA, and thus eligible for DI benefits. Furthermore, 
the criteria used to determine extent of disability vary 
among state workers’ compensation programs (Burton 
2005). We expect that these differences will systemati-
cally affect the DI application rates from state to state.
Reflecting Congressional concern about the rela-
tionship between the programs, the payment of DI and 
workers’ compensation benefits has been coordinated 
since 1965. Specifically, if a person receives both DI 
and workers’ compensation benefits, the combined 
benefits are limited to 80 percent of the claimant’s 
preinjury wage. Federal law provides a DI benefit 
reduction or “offset” in order to achieve the 80 percent 
limit. Initially, states could enact “reverse offset” laws 
Chart 2. 
DI application rates and acceptance ratios, 1981–1999
DI application rate DI acceptance ratio
1,200 0.8
0.7
1,000
0.6
800
0.5
600 0.4
0.3
400
0.2
200
0.1
0 0.0
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Year
SOURCE: Burkhauser and Houtenville (2006).
NOTE: Application rate reflects applicants per 100,000 adults aged 25–64; acceptance ratio equals the number of allowances divided by 
the number of denials.
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that reduced workers’ compensation benefits rather 
than DI benefits, but in 1981 Congress eliminated that 
option for states that had not already enacted reverse 
offset legislation.5
Several institutional features of workers’ compensa-
tion are likely to affect DI applications and awards. 
For example, many states limit the duration of work-
ers’ compensation benefit payments. Variation in the 
formulas used to calculate the weekly or monthly 
amounts of workers’ compensation benefits may 
similarly be expected to affect the value of workers’ 
compensation benefits relative to DI benefits, and 
thus influence the DI application rate. If, for example, 
a state has very generous workers’ compensation 
benefits, workers may be less likely to apply for DI 
benefits. Chart 3 shows that the expected benefits for 
workers’ compensation permanent disability (WCPD) 
claims generally declined in the 1990s.
In addition, workers are more likely to apply for DI 
benefits if they cannot qualify for workers’ compensa-
tion benefits. A number of states changed their work-
ers’ compensation laws during the 1990s to restrict 
eligibility for permanent disability benefits (Spieler 
and Burton 1998). These provisions included limits on 
the compensability of particular medical diagnoses, 
such as stress and carpal tunnel syndrome; limits on 
coverage when the injury involved the aggravation of a 
preexisting condition; restrictions on the compensabil-
ity of permanent total-disability cases; and changes in 
procedural rules and evidentiary standards, such as the 
requirement that medical conditions be documented 
by “objective medical” evidence. Burton and Spieler 
(2001, 2004) suggest that these changes are likely to 
have a disproportional effect on older workers, who are 
most likely to apply for DI benefits.
Research indicates that those legislative changes 
affected the workers’ compensation benefits received 
by injured workers.6 For example, in 1990, Oregon 
adopted legislation requiring the work injury to be the 
“major contributing cause” of disability for the claim-
ant to qualify for workers’ compensation benefits. 
Thomason and Burton (2005) estimate that this and 
similar changes had reduced the amount of benefits 
received by Oregon workers by about 25 percent 
by the mid-1990s. Guo and Burton (2010) find that 
changes in state compensability rules and increasingly 
stringent administrative practices were major con-
tributors to the decline in workers’ compensation cash 
benefits during the 1990s. Chart 3 shows the effect of 
tightening compensability rules for WCPD benefits. 
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Chart 3. 
Estimated effects of workers’ compensation program changes, 1981–1999
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
NOTE: “Expected WCPD benefits” reflects the number of weeks that benefits would replace the average weekly wage in the beneficiary’s 
state. “WCPD compensability rules” represents changes in eligibility rules resulting from legislation or court decisions, expressed as a 
cumulative index relative to rules in place in 1975; declining values indicate greater stringency.
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This article examines whether the developments in 
WCPD benefits during the 1990s shown in Chart 3 
explain a portion of the increase in DI applications 
shown in Chart 2.
Data and Variables
Three previous studies (Rupp and Stapleton 1995; 
Autor and Duggan 2003; Soss and Keiser 2006) 
used state-level data to estimate the extent to which 
selected DI program and population characteristics 
determined DI application rates. We employ most of 
the variables they used, and add two workers’ com-
pensation variables.
The previous studies employed different measures 
of the DI application rate. Rupp and Stapleton used DI 
applications per insured person, Autor and Duggan 
used the DI application rate among nonelderly adults, 
and Soss and Keiser used DI applications per 10,000 
residents. Presumably, Rupp and Stapleton’s measure 
is the most accurate, because only insured individuals 
can apply for DI. However, because we do not have 
access to state data on the DI-insured population, we 
turn to the second-best measure, Autor and Duggan’s 
DI applications per 100,000 adults aged 25–64. That 
measure excludes children and persons aged 65 or 
older from the application pool. Disabled children 
or students cannot file independent applications for 
DI benefits without sufficient working experience. 
Eligibility for DI benefits is restricted to the insured 
population younger than the Social Security full 
retirement age, which was 65 throughout the study’s 
observation period.7 We obtain the data on 1981–2001 
DI applications by state from Burkhauser and Houten-
ville (2006). In calculating the DI application rate, 
we account both for those who applied only for DI 
benefits and those who applied concurrently for DI and 
Supplemental Security Income payments.
We use two variables to measure the possible 
effects of workers’ compensation programs on DI 
application rates: expected benefits and compensabil-
ity rules for WCPD. We describe expected WCPD 
benefits, a measure of statutory benefits, in detail in 
Appendix A. Previous users of this variable include 
Krueger and Burton (1990); Thomason, Schmidle, 
and Burton (2001); and Guo and Burton (2010). Those 
studies use an actuarial procedure to calculate the 
expected cash payments for four types of workers’ 
compensation benefits: temporary total disability 
(TTD), permanent partial disability (PPD), permanent 
total disability (PTD), and fatality. The procedure uses 
information on state workers’ compensation laws, 
federal and state income taxes, Social Security taxes, 
and state average wages to produce expected workers’ 
compensation cash benefits for each state in each year 
from 1972 through 1999. The methods of calculating 
expected benefits assume identical injury composi-
tion, life expectancy distribution, and family status in 
order to insure that interstate variations are due solely 
to differences in wages and workers’ compensation 
statutory provisions.
Expected WCPD benefits values are expressed as 
the weighted average of expected benefits for PPD 
and PTD claims divided by the state’s average weekly 
wage.8 For example, the value of expected WCPD 
benefits for New York in 1981 is 61, which means 
the expected benefits per claim in 1981 were equal 
to 61 weeks of the state’s average weekly wage. The 
expected benefits variable measures the generosity of 
a state’s workers’ compensation benefits. We expect a 
negative relationship between expected WCPD ben-
efits and the DI application rate because more gener-
ous workers’ compensation benefits should reduce the 
incentives to seek other sources of support.
Year-to-year changes in expected WCPD benefits 
capture statutory changes to the duration and amount 
of cash benefits, but do not account for changes in 
eligibility standards or major court decisions that 
affect eligibility. The second variable, WCPD com-
pensability rules, captures such changes in state rules 
since 1975. For each state, the National Council on 
Compensation Insurance (NCCI) estimates the total 
effects of changes in workers’ compensation expected 
benefits and in statutes or court decisions that affect 
compensability rules. The difference between these 
NCCI estimates and our estimates of the effects 
of changes in expected WCPD benefits reflects the 
estimated effect of changes in WCPD compensability 
rules. Appendix B describes WCPD compensability 
rules in detail.
We calculate accumulated changes in the compen-
sability rules for PPD and PTD benefits using 1975 
as the baseline. For example, if a state liberalized 
its compensability rules by 10 percent in 1989 and 
10 percent in 1992, the value of its compensability 
change is 0 from 1975 through 1988, + 0.1 from 1989 
through 1991, and + 0.2 after 1991. We expect a nega-
tive relationship between WCPD compensability rules 
and DI application because workers who qualify for 
workers’ compensation benefits are less likely to apply 
for benefits from other programs for disabled persons. 
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As shown in Chart 3, the WCPD compensability rules 
tightened between 1981 and 1999, which should have 
resulted in more applications for DI benefits.
We also adopt six independent variables from the 
previous studies to explain the DI application rate: 
DI acceptance ratio, DI replacement rate, population 
median age, disability prevalence, women’s share of 
employment, and unemployment rate. The DI accep-
tance ratio is equal to the number of DI allowances 
divided by the number of DI denials. Chart 2 shows 
national average DI acceptance ratios. In our regres-
sions, we use each state’s DI acceptance ratio with a 
1-year lag. A higher acceptance ratio may encourage 
more DI applications in subsequent years. However, 
more DI applications may result in more stringent 
acceptance decisions. Although the federal govern-
ment establishes the general standards for DI eligi-
bility, state agencies make the initial administrative 
decisions and if DI applications increase, the agency 
may informally tighten the acceptance criteria to keep 
the number of awards from increasing too rapidly. As 
a result, the expected sign of the DI acceptance ratio 
is uncertain.9
The DI replacement rate equals the average monthly 
DI benefit per disabled worker divided by the state 
average monthly wage. Median age is self-explanatory. 
Disability prevalence data are self-reported character-
istics from Census Bureau’s Current Population Sur-
veys. We could not find a source of nonself-reported 
information covering our study period. However, 
most previous studies confirm that self-reported work 
limitations are strong predictors of DI participa-
tion (Burkhauser, Butler, and Weathers 2001/2002; 
Daly 1998; Rupp and Davies 2004). Women’s share 
of employment is also self-explanatory, as is unem-
ployment rate. Based on previous studies, we expect 
these last five variables to correlate positively with 
DI applications.
Two previous studies examine the relationship 
between workers’ compensation and DI. In the first, 
Guo and Burton (2008) find that the DI application 
rate increased from 1985 through 1999 as the statutory 
level of workers’ compensation benefits declined and 
eligibility rules tightened. The authors calculate work-
ers’ compensation variables using the weighted aver-
age of TTD, PPD, PTD, and fatality benefits. However, 
most workers’ compensation beneficiaries receive 
only TTD benefits and are unlikely to qualify for DI 
benefits (which are not provided for temporary dis-
abilities). Thus, the workers’ compensation variables 
used in Guo and Burton (2008) do not provide the best 
measures of cases that could potentially result in DI 
applications. By contrast, the variables in the current 
analysis consider only PPD and PTD claims, which 
should provide a more precise estimate of the spillover 
effect to DI. The present analysis also extends the 
period of coverage to 1981–1999 and reformulates the 
model to minimize some statistical problems.
In the second study, McInerney and Simon (2012) 
conclude “it is unlikely that state workers’ compensa-
tion changes were a meaningful factor in explaining 
the rise in DI during our study period of 1986 to 
2001.” One major difference between that study and 
this article is that we use different variables to mea-
sure important features of state programs. McInerney 
and Simon, for example, use state PPD maximum 
weekly benefits as a measure of workers’ compensa-
tion generosity in their regression models. However, 
PPD maximum weekly benefits are only one of the 
factors determining the generosity of PPD benefits. 
Some states base PPD benefits on the degree of injury, 
while others base them on the extent of lost earning 
capacity. Most states impose maximum durations or 
dollar amounts on PPD benefits (unlike PTD benefits, 
which in many states can continue for life), and these 
limits vary among states. For example, losing an 
arm is compensated for 312 weeks in the District of 
Columbia, but for 224 weeks in Georgia. The eligibil-
ity rules for PPD benefits also vary across states. The 
findings from McInerney and Simon’s study may be 
misleading because using maximum weekly benefits 
as the sole measurement of generosity is limiting.
This article’s two independent variables provide 
more refined measurements of state workers’ compen-
sation programs. The first, expected benefits, relies on 
actuarial evaluations of state laws for both PPD and 
PTD benefits. “Expected benefits” considers not only 
maximum weekly benefits but also minimum weekly 
benefits, nominal replacement rates (weekly benefit 
relative to the worker’s previous earnings), and the 
durations of two or more types of PPD benefits (such 
as scheduled and unscheduled) used in each state.10 
We add the second variable, compensability rules, to 
capture changes to eligibility rules in state workers’ 
compensation programs. Guo and Burton (2010) find 
that expected benefits and compensability rules are 
both statistically significant variables that help explain 
the decline of workers’ compensation benefits in the 
1990s. We expect those two variables to estimate the 
impact of workers’ compensation program changes on 
DI application rates in the 1990s more accurately than 
the variables used by McInerney and Simon (2012).
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Regression Results
We examine the determinants of DI application in 
three steps. First, we try to replicate the findings from 
previous studies for the six independent variables: DI 
acceptance ratio, DI replacement rate, median age, dis-
ability prevalence, women’s share of employment, and 
unemployment rate. Second, we add the two WCPD 
variables (expected benefits and compensability rules) 
to examine whether changes in program laws and 
rules also help determine DI application rates. Third, 
we estimate the extent to which workers’ compensa-
tion program changes spilled over into higher DI 
application rates during the 1990s. The first two steps 
employ fixed-effects regression models. The third 
step uses a simulation model based on the regression 
results from the second step.
The investigation covers 46 states from 1981 
through 1999.11 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics 
for the study variables. Most variables have 969 
observations; for WCPD compensability rules, miss-
ing values reduce the number of observations to 855.12 
To be consistent across models, we use 855 observa-
tions for all variables.13 A major potential problem for 
a panel data set is the unobserved variances of the 
missing variables. Many factors, such as differences 
in the political environment across states or changes 
in national attitudes towards disabled persons over 
time, are difficult or impossible to measure. Those 
unobserved variances, if correlated with the dependent 
variable or independent variables, will bias the results 
of an ordinary least square regression model. Econo-
metricians usually employ one of two techniques to 
control for the unobserved variables in the panel data: 
fixed effects or random effects. When the unobserved 
variances are correlated with the independent vari-
ables, a random-effect model is preferred; otherwise, 
a fixed model is more appropriate (Greene 2011). We 
ran Hausman tests for our panel data that indicated 
a fixed-effect model should be more efficient for our 
regressions.
In the five studies discussed above, Rupp and 
Stapleton (1995) and Soss and Keiser (2006) use only 
time fixed-effects models; Autor and Duggan (2003) 
employ a combination of first-difference observations 
(which is similar to time fixed-effects) and state fixed-
effects; and Guo and Burton (2008) and McInerney 
and Simon (2012) use both time and state fixed-effects 
models.
To demonstrate the differences generated by the 
time and state fixed effects, we present four models for 
Mean
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
832.00 219.07 343.60 1,765.34
Expected WCPD benefits b 53.35 32.74 15.61 377.72
WCPD compensability rules c -0.14 0.31 -1.30 0.90
Prior-year DI acceptance ratio d 0.59 0.18 0.24 1.30
DI replacement rate e 0.32 0.04 0.18 0.42
Median age (years) 32.75 2.40 24.40 38.70
Disability prevalence 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.15
Women's share of employment  0.46 0.02 0.39 0.52
Unemployment rate 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.16
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
DI claims accepted divided by claims denied in previous year.
Average monthly DI benefit divided by average monthly wage.
Actuarial value (in 1982–1984 dollars) of PPD and PTD benefits under state workers' compensation statute divided by state average 
weekly wage.
Effective cumulative change since 1975 as a result of statutory changes to and court decisions affecting PPD and PTD benefits.
Applications per 100,000 adults aged 25–64; includes DI-only and concurrent DI and SSI applications. 
SOURCES: Burkhauser and Houtenville (2006); SSA; Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors' calculations; Cornell University Rehabilitation 
Research and Training Center on Disability Demographics and Statistics; and Census Bureau.
NOTES: Data reflect 855 observations in 46 states from 1981 through 1999, except as noted.
Table 1. 
Definitions and descriptive statistics for study variables
Variable
DI application rate a
Workers' compensation variables
Independent variables 
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our regression results: model 1 includes neither year 
dummies nor state dummies, model 2 includes year 
dummies only, model 3 includes state dummies only, 
and model 4 includes both state and year dummies.14 
Model 4 is our preferred model, because it controls 
for unobserved variations across states and years. To 
correct for heteroskedasticity, we employ weighted 
least-square regressions (using state employment as 
weights) and robust standard errors for all regression 
models.
Regressions Excluding Workers’ 
Compensation Variables 
Table 2 reports that the DI replacement rate, disability 
prevalence, and unemployment rate are positively and 
significantly associated with DI application in all four 
models. (In model 4, the coefficient on the DI replace-
ment rate is significant at the 0.05 confidence level, 
the coefficient on disability prevalence is significant 
at the 0.10 confidence level, and the coefficient on the 
unemployment rate is significant at the 0.01 confidence 
level.) The coefficients for women’s share of employ-
ment are positive and statistically significant in three 
models (including model 4, where the coefficient is 
significant at the 0.10 confidence level). The coefficient 
on median age is not statistically significant at the 0.10 
confidence level in the first two models, but is positive 
and significant in models 3 and 4 at the 0.01 confi-
dence level.
Model 4 replicates the findings in previous studies. 
The results for the DI acceptance ratio are paradoxi-
cal because they are inconsistent across models and 
the coefficient is not significant at the 0.10 confidence 
level in our preferred model 4. Guo and Burton (2008) 
find a significant and negative relationship between 
state stringency for DI awards and the DI application 
rate but, as discussed in note 9, that result was prob-
ably biased. None of the other four studies investigate 
the impact of state administrative stringency for DI 
awards on the number of DI applications. The nature 
of the relationship between higher acceptance ratios 
and the DI application rate remains murky despite our 
best effort.
According to model 4, the coefficient on DI replace-
ment rate is 583.98, meaning that when the DI replace-
ment rate increased by 10 percentage points, 58.4 more 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
3.70 -136.14*** 153.61*** (42.66)
(33.15) (33.20) (33.01) (29.88)
1,097.15*** 1,083.73*** 1,660.79*** 583.98**
(159.53) (148.56) (341.24) (247.73)
4.02 1.19 35.31*** 21.38***
(2.90) (2.82) (4.62) (6.81)
6,205.44*** 5,409.19*** 1,798.05*** 515.81*
(381.72) (333.30) (396.00) (275.16)
3,218.80*** 2,805.43*** 858.15 634.11*
(452.64) (407.06) (537.66) (350.44)
3,000.05*** 2,884.85*** 3,433.24*** 2,632.96***
(335.71) (360.75) (290.43) (244.80)
No Yes No Yes
No No Yes Yes
0.52 0.65 0.79 0.91
Data are weighted least-square regressions using state employment as the weight. 
* = significant at the 0.10 level; ** = significant at the 0.05 level; *** = significant at the 0.01 level. 
Disability prevalence
DI replacement rate
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
NOTES: Data reflect 855 observations in 46 states from 1981 through 1999.
The dependent variable is DI applicants per 100,000 nonelderly adults.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Table 2.
Alternative regressions examining determinants of DI application during 1981–1999, excluding workers' 
compensation variables
Variables
Prior-year DI acceptance ratio 
R-square
State dummies
Year dummies
Unemployment rate
Women's share of employment
Median age
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individuals per 100,000 nonelderly adults applied for 
DI benefits. (The mean value for DI applications in our 
sample was 832 per 100,000 nonelderly adults.) This 
result is lower than Autor and Duggan’s (2003) find-
ing; however, their examination of the DI replacement 
rate focuses on low-wage workers, while our measure 
is the state average replacement rate applicable to all 
workers. We are not surprised that low-income work-
ers are more likely to apply for DI benefits than are 
workers overall. Our results also suggest that a 10 per-
centage point growth in disability prevalence induces 
51.6 more applications per 100,000 nonelderly adults, 
a finding similar to that of Soss and Keiser (2006). 
Model 4 also indicates that if the median age increases 
by 1 year, 21.4 more persons of every 100,000 non-
elderly adults apply for DI benefits. For every 10 per-
centage point difference between states in the share 
of female workers, the state with the higher share 
receives 63.4 more applications for every 100,000 
nonelderly adults. Finally, a 10 percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate leads to 263.3 addi-
tional DI applications per 100,000 nonelderly adults; 
that result falls in the range of findings reviewed by 
Rupp and Stapleton (1995, Chart 4).
Regressions Including Workers’ 
Compensation Variables
In the regressions in Table 3 we include the expected 
WCPD benefits and WCPD compensability rules 
variables. The coefficient for expected WCPD ben-
efits is consistently negative and significant (at the 
0.01 confidence level in models 1, 3, and 4, and at the 
0.05 confidence level in model 2), as expected. Model 
4 suggests that when expected WCPD benefits are 
reduced by an amount equal to 1 week of a state’s 
average weekly wage, DI applications increase by 0.51 
per 100,000 nonelderly adults. This means that a state 
with expected WCPD benefits that were one standard 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
-0.73*** -0.37** -0.82*** -0.51***
(0.19) (0.18) (0.25) (0.15)
38.51** 57.06*** -46.98* -30.95**
(17.75) (13.65) (26.44) (13.67)
6.61 -151.77*** 160.11*** -35.95
(33.57) (34.37) (32.99) (29.77)
1,287.25*** 1,312.30*** 1,638.04*** 597.80**
(165.67) (151.57) (346.86) (256.49)
4.88* 1.50 32.35*** 17.54***
(2.88) (2.83) (4.71) (7.02)
6,242.58*** 5,435.56*** 1,764.78*** 507.62*
(380.97) (334.64) (391.30) (272.62)
3,339.72*** 2,882.38*** 1,051.92** 765.88**
(460.34) (411.25) (530.79) (355.82)
2,924.86*** 2,737.95*** 3,407.37 2,605.93***
(334.52) (358.60) (287.53) (248.59)
No Yes No Yes
No No Yes Yes
0.53 0.66 0.79 0.92
Data are weighted least-square regressions using state employment as the weight. 
The dependent variable is DI applicants per 100,000 nonelderly adults.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
* = significant at the 0.10 level; ** = significant at the 0.05 level; *** = significant at the 0.01 level. 
WCPD compensability rules
Expected WCPD benefits
Variables
Table 3.
Alternative regressions examining determinants of DI application during 1981–1999, including workers' 
compensation variables
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
NOTES: Data reflect 855 observations in 46 states from 1981 through 1999.
R-square
State dummies
Year dummies
Unemployment rate
Women's share of employment
Median age
Disability prevalence
DI replacement rate
Prior-year DI acceptance ratio 
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deviation below the national average (as shown 
in Table 1) had about 33 more 
100,000 nonelderly adults than
that were one standard deviati
average.15 Because the mean D
sample was 832 per 100,000 n
effect of expected WCPD bene
is statistically significant but s
The WCPD compensability 
DI applications per 
 a state with benefits 
on above the national 
I application rate in our 
onelderly adults, the 
fits on DI applications 
mall.
rules variable is 
positively correlated with DI applications in models 
1 and 2, contrary to our expectations. However, its 
coefficient becomes negative when we include state 
dummies in model 3 (significant at the 0.10 level of 
confidence) and model 4 (significant at the 0.05 level 
of confidence). Workers’ compensation is a state 
program and many factors, such as the availability of 
lawyers who can handle both workers’ compensation 
and DI cases, probably are important to the preva-
lence of DI applications, but are not measured in any 
data set. The differences in results among the four 
models for compensability rules confirm that using 
state fixed-effect models to control for unobserved 
state-specific variances is critical for avoiding biased 
estimates. In our preferred formulation (model 4), the 
results suggest that the liberalization of state compen-
sability rules by 10 percent relative to 1975 decreases 
DI applications by 3.1 per 100,000 nonelderly adults. 
This means that a state with a WCPD compensability 
rules value that was one standard deviation below the 
national average had about 19 more DI applications 
per 100,000 nonelderly adults than a state with a value 
that was one standard deviation above the national 
average—again, a relatively small effect.16
The results for the nonworkers’ compensation vari-
ables in Table 3 are similar in significance and magni-
tude to the coefficients in Table 2. Including workers’ 
compensation variables thus does not affect the results 
of the six independent variables used in previous stud-
ies of the determinants of DI application.
The Spillover from Workers’  
Compensation Reforms
During the 1990s, the values of the expected WCPD 
benefits and WCPD compensability rules variables 
both declined, as shown in Chart 3. These changes, in 
combination with the coefficients for these two vari-
ables (Table 3, model 4), confirm that developments 
within the workers’ compensation program explain a 
modest portion of the increase in the DI application 
rate during that decade.
From the 1980s to the 1990s, the national aver-
age annual DI application rate increased from 775 to 
853 claims per 100,000 nonelderly adults (Table 4), 
a 10 percent increase. To what extent did workers’ 
compensation reforms spill over into the growth of 
the DI application rate during that period? In Table 4, 
we use the regression results from model 4 in Table 3 
Table 4.
Extent of changes in national average DI application rates from the 1980s to the 1990s explained by 
each variable
National annual average Difference 
between 
1980s and Coefficient Predicted Explained 
Variable 1981–1989 1990–1999 1990s from model 4 change a change b (%)
DI application rate 775.09 852.54 77.44 … 77.44 …
Expected WCPD benefits 48.29 45.64 -2.65 -0.51 1.35 1.75
WCPD compensability rules -0.08 -0.12 -0.05 -30.95 1.46 1.89
Prior-year DI acceptance ratio 0.54 0.59 0.05 -35.95 1.81 -2.34
DI replacement rate 0.31 0.30 -0.01 597.81 -6.39 -8.25
Median age 31.55 34.24 2.70 17.54 47.30 61.08
Disability prevalence 0.08 0.08 c 507.62 1.53 1.98
Women's share of employment 0.44 0.46 0.02 765.88 13.43 17.34
Unemployment rate 0.07 0.06 -0.01 2,605.93 -35.09 -45.31
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
NOTE: … = not applicable.
a. Product of "difference between 1980s and 1990s" and "coefficient from model 4."
b. Equals predicted change in value of variable divided by predicted change in DI application rate (77.44).
c. Less than 0.005.
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to estimate each variable’s contribution toward the 
growth of the DI application rate. Table 4’s first two 
columns present the national annual average for each 
variable during the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. 
The third column shows the change in value for each 
variable between the two decades. The fourth column 
presents the coefficients from model 4 in Table 3. We 
multiply columns 3 and 4 to obtain the values in col-
umn 5, the predicted changes in the DI application rate 
based on our regression results. Column 6 shows the 
percentages of the change in DI application rates from 
the 1980s to the 1990s explained by each variable.
Our results indicate that the aging of the population 
was the largest contributor to the growth in DI appli-
cation, and that it accounted for more than one-half 
the growth of the DI application rate in the 1990s. 
Women’s share of employment was another important 
factor, associated with about 17 percent of the change 
in DI application rates between the decades. The DI 
replacement rate and the unemployment rate generally 
declined across those two decades, which would have 
resulted in a lower DI application rate if the values 
of other independent variables had not changed. The 
change in the disability prevalence rate was mini-
mal during the period. Thus, the latter three factors 
were not sources of the higher DI application rates in 
the 1990s.
Our results suggest that workers’ compensation pro-
gram reforms during the 1990s combined to contribute 
3–4 percent of the growth of the DI application rate 
during that period. Specifically, changes in expected 
WCPD benefits and WCPD compensability rules 
respectively explained 1.75 percent and 1.89 percent 
of the growth of the DI application rate between the 
1980s and 1990s.
Conclusions
In this article we attempted to replicate the results of 
earlier studies of the determinants of interstate differ-
ences in DI benefit application rates. Those studies did 
not include variables measuring aspects of state work-
ers’ compensation programs. Our results in Tables 2 
and 3 basically confirm the previous findings.
Another purpose of this article was to investigate 
whether the growth of DI application in the 1990s 
could be partially explained by changes in state work-
ers’ compensation programs. The findings in Table 3 
suggest that both expected WCPD benefits and WCPD 
compensability rules modestly affect the DI applica-
tion rate. Because the values of both variables declined 
in the 1990s, the statistical results help explain the 
increase in the DI application rate during the decade. 
Our results are consistent with those of Guo and 
Burton (2008), but differ from those in McInerney and 
Simon (2012) because we find a small effect of state 
workers’ compensation program changes on DI appli-
cation, while McInerney and Simon concluded that 
program changes were unlikely to cause the rise in DI 
applications. We believe that the results differ because 
this study relies on better measures of state workers’ 
compensation programs.
Policy Implications
Our findings raise potential concerns about the 
financial status of the DI Trust Fund. Those concerns 
stem from the assumption that some of the increased 
application for DI benefits due to changes in workers’ 
compensation programs during the 1990s resulted 
in additional DI awards. Although we believe this 
assumption is reasonable, we have not yet tested the 
transfer of costs from workers’ compensation to DI. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that increased application 
for DI benefits results in more DI awards, the changes 
in the workers’ compensation program have con-
tributed modestly to the financial problems if the DI 
Trust Fund.17
Further concerns involve the potential reduction 
in incentives to improve workplace safety.18 Workers’ 
compensation programs promote safety by using two 
types of experience rating to determine employer 
premiums. The industry-level experience rating estab-
lishes a premium rate based largely on prior benefit 
payments by the industry. The resulting differences in 
labor costs and prices between industries should shift 
the composition of national consumption towards safer 
products. The firm-level experience rating determines 
the workers’ compensation premium for each firm 
(above a minimum size) by comparing its prior benefit 
payments with those of other firms in the industry. 
Firms thus have an incentive to improve safety in 
order to reduce premiums and remain competitive.
Scholars have debated the safety effects of the 
workers’ compensation program in general and of 
firm-level experience rating in particular. A survey of 
the literature by Boden (1995) concludes, “research on 
the safety impacts has not provided a clear answer to 
whether workers’ compensation improves workplace 
safety” (p. 285). By contrast, Thomason (2005) asserts 
that most of the studies he surveyed (11 of 14) found 
that experience rating improves safety and health and 
that studies failing to detect the relationship did so 
because of methodological weaknesses. Thomason 
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concludes that “taken as a whole, the evidence is quite 
compelling: experience rating works” (p. 26). Guo 
and Burton (2010) find that the national average of 
incurred workers’ compensation cash benefits declined 
by 41.6 percent during the 1990s, and over 30 percent 
of this decline was due to changes in the state workers’ 
compensation programs, such as tightening compen-
sability rules. To the extent that the costs of workplace 
injuries shift from workers’ compensation to workers 
and their families or to other programs for disabled 
workers, the safety incentives provided by the work-
ers’ compensation program are diluted. Safety incen-
tives have probably also been diluted—to the extent 
that costs have been shifted from workers’ compensa-
tion to the DI program—because the former relies on 
a firm-level experience rating and the latter does not 
experience-rate the DI payroll tax.19
Placing our Results in Context
First, some determinants of DI application are inexo-
rable and are largely beyond the purview of public 
policy. Population aging and women’s increasing 
workforce participation are examples, which together 
explain over 70 percent of the increase in the DI appli-
cation rate during the period we studied.
Second, some determinants of DI application are 
significantly affected by public policies that are largely 
based on factors external to the DI program. Examples 
are policies addressing the unemployment rate, includ-
ing fiscal and monetary policy. Our results suggest 
that declining unemployment rates reduced the DI 
application rate by about 45 percent between the 1980s 
and 1990s.
Third, the determinants of DI application that are 
directly affected by public policies at the federal level 
are largely based on factors internal to the DI pro-
gram. An example we examined was the DI replace-
ment rate, which essentially measures how adequately 
DI benefits replace disabled workers’ lost earnings. 
Our results suggest that the decline in the DI replace-
ment rate between the 1980s and 1990s reduced the 
DI application rate by about 8 percent. Other federal 
policy tools that can increase or decrease the applica-
tion rate include changing the stringency of DI benefit 
eligibility standards.
Fourth, the determinants of DI application affected 
by state-level public policies include changes in work-
ers’ compensation programs. Although the primary 
purpose of those changes is not to affect DI application 
rates, they nonetheless have consequences for the DI 
program. The effects of workers’ compensation policy 
changes on DI application are limited when compared 
with socioeconomic developments such as the aging 
workforce and unemployment, and are less important 
than policy decisions made at the federal level, such 
as the level of the DI replacement rate. Nonetheless, 
our findings suggest that changes in the state workers’ 
compensation programs during the 1990s resulted in a 
modest increase in applications for DI benefits during 
that period.
Further Research
Several avenues offer promise for further research. 
One such avenue is to extend the study period. This 
article limits its examination to the period between 
1981 and 1999 because the data for workers’ compen-
sation expected benefits and compensability rules for 
more recent years are not yet available. Another reason 
we selected that period is that it largely overlaps the 
1986–2001 study period of McInerney and Simon 
(2012), which allows a comparison of the two studies’ 
methodologies, variables, and findings. Nonetheless, 
the types of changes in workers’ compensation pro-
grams that affected DI application rates in the 1990s 
continued into the current century and may have had 
a greater impact recently. Most of the reforms in the 
1990s were in smaller states and thus had a limited 
effect on the national DI application rate.20 Since 
2000, some states have increased permanent disability 
benefits; however, many of the workers’ compensa-
tion reforms that reduced benefits occurred in larger 
states. California, Florida, and New York accounted 
for almost one-third of workers’ compensation benefit 
payments as of 2005 (Sengupta, Reno, and Burton 
2011, Table 7). Between 2000 and 2009, California 
reduced PPD benefits by over 60 percent, Florida by 
almost 20 percent, and New York by about 20 percent 
(NCCI 2011, Exhibit III). We will study the effects 
of these changes on DI application rates as soon as 
the data for the expected WCPD benefits and WCPD 
compensability rules variables are updated.
Research could also consider aspects of the DI 
program besides applications. We only examined the 
effects of workers’ compensation program changes on 
DI application rates because much of the DI program 
research focuses on the determinants of application. 
However, workers’ compensation program changes 
can lead to adverse DI program outcomes in addi-
tion to higher application rates. Recall that in 2010, 
13.5 percent of workers receiving DI benefits were also 
current or former recipients of workers’ compensation 
or public disability benefits; and for some, DI benefits 
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were reduced by the offset rules (Sengupta, Reno, and 
Burton 2011, Table 17). For most workers whose DI 
benefits are limited by the offset rule, a $100 reduction 
in workers’ compensation benefits results in a $100 
increase in DI benefits. Our research to date has not 
considered this type of cost shifting from state work-
ers’ compensation programs to the DI program.
Appendix A: Calculating Expected  
WCPD Benefits
The methodology used to construct the expected 
WCPD benefits variable is adapted from an actuarial 
procedure used by the NCCI to evaluate how changes 
in state workers’ compensation laws affect program 
costs, as measured by benefit payments.21 The NCCI 
procedure evaluates statutory changes affecting 
medical benefits and four types of cash benefits: 
TTD, PPD, PTD, and fatality. For each type of cash 
benefits, expected benefits are equal to the product 
of the average weekly benefit paid to claimants and 
the average duration of benefit payments in weeks. 
The NCCI then combines the separate estimates for 
the four types of expected cash benefits and uses a 
national distribution of claims by type to estimate an 
overall average expected cash benefit for all disabling 
injury and illness claims in each state. For this study, 
we have calculated expected WCPD benefits based 
only on PPD and PTD claims because these relatively 
serious injuries are the types most likely to qualify for 
DI benefits.
The weekly amount for each type of benefit is 
calculated based on the state’s average weekly wage, 
the percentage of preinjury wages replaced by the 
benefit (nominal replacement rate), and the minimum 
and maximum benefit amounts (which will affect the 
actual replacement rate for some workers). In addition, 
we account for the distribution of wages around the 
state’s average weekly wage, which will indicate how 
many workers are affected by the minimum or maxi-
mum weekly benefits. Adjustments are made to the 
weekly benefit in those states that coordinate workers’ 
compensation benefits with other programs, including 
DI and Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, and in those 
few states that index the weekly benefit to the cost of 
living or the state’s average weekly wage.
PTD Duration and Expected Benefits
Some jurisdictions limit the duration or the total 
dollar amount of PTD benefits. Unless such a limit 
was specified, we assumed that benefits are payable 
for life. In either case, we determined the duration of 
benefits using an age distribution of PTD claimants 
and mortality information provided by the NCCI. 
We calculated expected benefit duration for every 
claimant in the age distribution and then multiplied it 
by the average weekly benefit amount to obtain total 
expected PTD benefits.
For states where PTD benefits are offset by DI 
benefits, we divided the total benefit period into four 
subperiods. The first is a 6-month waiting period 
during which we assumed the claimant received no DI 
benefits. The second is a period during which the DI 
benefit includes dependent benefits (for those claim-
ants with dependent children). The third is a period 
after the children have reached majority and during 
which only the basic DI benefit is paid. The fourth is 
a period, beginning at age 65, when DI benefits are no 
longer paid. Benefit durations are calculated for each 
of these periods, adjusted for mortality and discounted 
to the present at 3.5 percent. The duration value for 
each component is then multiplied by the applicable 
weekly PTD benefit for that period to estimate the 
present value of lifetime benefits.
For those states in which workers’ compensation 
benefits are reduced (“offset”) if the worker receives 
Old-Age Insurance benefits, we make one benefit 
duration calculation for a beneficiary through age 64 
and another for ages 65 and older. Both benefit 
duration calculations are adjusted for mortality and 
discounted at 3.5 percent, and then multiplied by the 
appropriate weekly benefit (whether offset or not) to 
obtain the expected total amount of PTD benefits in 
the state.
PPD Duration and Expected Benefits
Most states recognize two different types of PPDs for 
workers’ compensation: those affecting a particular 
body part included on a list (or schedule) of injuries 
contained in the statute and those that do not. These 
injury types are thus called scheduled and nonsched-
uled PPDs.22 The maximum duration of scheduled 
benefits for the physical loss or loss of use of a par-
ticular body part is specified by statute. For example, 
in New York, a worker who loses the use of a leg is 
entitled to 288 weeks of benefits, while a worker who 
loses an arm is entitled to 312 weeks of benefits. In 
the event of a partial physical loss or loss of use of a 
scheduled body part, benefits are prorated based on 
the amount specified for the entire loss, so that a New 
York worker who has suffered a 25 percent loss of an 
arm is entitled to 78 weeks of benefits.
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The basis for nonscheduled PPD benefits—that is, 
those involving a body part not specifically mentioned 
in the statute—varies widely among states. Some 
states base nonscheduled benefits on the permanent-
impairment approach, which essentially evaluates 
the medical consequences of a workplace injury or 
disease. Other states base nonscheduled benefits on an 
evaluation of the workplace injury’s consequences on 
the worker’s earning capacity. Still other states base 
nonscheduled benefits on the extent of the worker’s 
actual loss of wages from the workplace injury or 
diseases. Some states place the same duration limit 
on all nonscheduled PPD benefits, while the limits 
vary in other states, depending on the severity of the 
consequences of the injury (for example, the loss of 
wage-earning capacity).
For scheduled PPD benefits, and for nonscheduled 
PPD benefits based on the permanent-impairment 
or the loss-of-earning-capacity approach, we use a 
national distribution of PPD claims by body part and 
degree of permanent impairment provided by the 
NCCI. For states using the actual-wage-loss approach, 
we use a distribution based on Berkowitz and Burton 
(1987) to determine the extent of wage loss associ-
ated with a given degree of permanent impairment. 
This information is then linked to the NCCI’s PPD 
distribution to create a wage-loss distribution for 
PPD claimants.
Each state’s workers’ compensation statutory 
information is then combined with the resulting PPD 
distribution (wage loss, earning capacity, or permanent 
impairment) to determine average disability duration. 
PPD benefit durations are adjusted for mortality and 
discounted at 3.5 percent. The adjusted average benefit 
durations are then multiplied by the average weekly 
benefit to obtain the expected total amount of PPD 
benefits in the state.
In order to provide consistent estimates across years 
and states, we use this distribution of cases (based on 
NCCI data): fatal (0.002357), PTD (0.003162), major 
PPD (0.085293), minor PPD (0.240863), and TTD 
(0.668324). Because this study focuses on the more 
serious injuries, it uses only the PTD, major PPD, and 
minor PPD weights.
Previous Use of the Expected  
Benefits Variable
For more than 55 years, the NCCI has used an actu-
arial procedure to estimate the effect of changes in 
workers’ compensation statutes on the amount of 
benefits paid.23 As described in NCCI (2011), the 
procedure involves calculating the ratio of benefit 
amounts for a representative group of accidents under 
the new law to the amounts for the same group of acci-
dents under the old law. The ratios are calculated for 
seven benefit categories: fatal, PTD, major PPD, minor 
PPD, TTD, total indemnity (a weighted average of the 
previous categories), medical, and total (a weighted 
average of total indemnity and medical). NCCI has 
published ratios for 1965 and later in Exhibit III of 
Annual Statistical Bulletin (ASB) editions dating from 
1982.
There are several limitations to the ratios of benefit 
level changes published in the ASB. First, the ratios 
are only calculated when a statute changes. Thus, 
because New York made no statutory changes between 
1998 and 2006, the value shown for those years in 
the ASB is zero. However, the state’s average weekly 
wage increased during those years, resulting in higher 
cash benefit payments for many workers. Second, 
the ratios are calculated each time a state changes its 
statute. New York changed its cash or medical benefits 
on three different dates during 2007. Third, ASB only 
publishes ratios for states with private insurance car-
riers, and not for those, such as Ohio and Washington, 
with exclusive state funds. Fourth, the ratios are useful 
for tracing developments in individual states, but 
interstate differences in the amounts of benefits cannot 
be determined. State A may have increased benefits by 
15 percent during the 1990s and state B by 5 percent 
during that decade, but because we do not know how 
generous the benefits were in each state as of 1990, 
we do not know whether the difference in total ben-
efits between the states widened or narrowed during 
the 1990s.
The expected benefits variable is first used for 
research purposes in Burton (1965). Under the tutelage 
of Roy Kallop, the NCCI Actuary, Burton adapted 
the NCCI procedure and prepared Statutory Benefit 
Indexes (expected benefits) for 25 states (includ-
ing Ohio and West Virginia, which had exclusive 
state workers’ compensation funds) for 1958 and 
1962. Results for 1962 in Burton’s “Over-all Benefit 
Index, Including Medical Benefits” vary from .742 
in Alabama to 1.541 in Connecticut. Burton uses the 
“Over-all Benefit Index, Including Medical Benefits” 
and the “Over-all Benefit Index, Excluding Medical 
Benefits” as independent variables (together with other 
variables, such as an “Index of Legal Generosity”) in 
regressions in which the dependent variable is a mea-
sure of the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation 
insurance for a uniform set of insurance classes. With 
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observations from all 25 states, the “Over-all Benefit 
Index, Excluding Medical Benefits” has a regression 
coefficient of 0.5099 with a standard error of 0.1224, 
which is significant at the .01 probability level (Burton 
1965, Table 47).
Expanding Burton’s earlier work on interstate 
differences in employers’ costs of workers’ com-
pensation, Krueger and Burton (1990) examine the 
determinants of two measures of the employers’ costs 
in 29 states for 1972, 1975, 1978, and 1983. The coef-
ficients on the log of expected benefits are positive and 
highly significant in all 12 regressions, which contain 
a variety of other independent variables. The authors 
note: “The results indicate that for either measure of 
workers’ compensation costs we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there is a unit elasticity between costs 
and benefits, regardless of the set of included regres-
sors” (p. 236).
Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001) examine 
several topics, including the effects of insurance regu-
lation on the employers’ costs of workers’ compensa-
tion and on workplace safety. The authors calculate 
expected benefits for each year from 1975 through 
1995 for as many as 48 jurisdictions, then compare 
the results for this expanded data set with Krueger 
and Burton’s 1990 results. The new results produce 
coefficients for the benefits variable that, in general, 
are significantly less than 1.0. The authors suggest 
that the benefit coefficient estimates may be subject 
to omitted-variable bias and measurement error; 
however, taken at face value, “the result suggests that 
a 10 percent increase in benefits results in a 4 percent 
increase in costs” (p. 108).
Thomason and Burton (2004) discuss several ways 
to compare the benefits in state workers’ compensa-
tion programs, including maximum weekly TTD 
benefits, average weekly TTD benefits, and expected 
(statutory) benefits. The authors explain the expected 
benefits methodology and present data on expected 
benefits over time, among jurisdictions, and relative to 
the Model Workers’ Compensation Act. For example, 
expected benefits by state in 1998 “ranged from a little 
more than $30,000 for the average injured worker in 
the District of Columbia to less than $5,000 for (hypo-
thetically) identical injured workers in Louisiana, a 
sixfold difference” (p. 81).
Guo and Burton (2010) examine the determinants of 
interstate differences in workers’ compensation cash 
benefits per 100,000 workers for each year from 1975 
to 1999 for 46 jurisdictions (fewer in some years). One 
of the independent variables is expected benefits for 
the combination of four types of cash benefits. Among 
other conclusions, the authors find that “the benefit 
elasticity (the association between expected benefits 
and actual benefits payments) was significantly less 
than 1.0 in both our study periods (1975-89 and 
1990-99). One interpretation of these results is that the 
monitoring and rehabilitation effects for employers are 
stronger than the reporting effect and duration effects 
for workers” (p. 353). 
Appendix B. Calculating WCPD 
Compensability Rules
 As mentioned earlier, NCCI publishes data on benefit 
level changes in Exhibit III of the ASB. The exhibit 
provides estimated increases or decreases in benefits 
resulting from changes in workers’ compensation 
statutes, medical fee schedules, and significant court 
decisions. Over the years, the ASB has given separate 
estimates for these benefit types: fatal, permanent 
total, major permanent partial (until 2009), minor 
permanent partial (until 2009), combined permanent 
partial (since 2000), temporary total, all indemnity 
(cash) benefits, medical, and total (cash plus medical).
The estimated change in benefits paid combines the 
effects of three components:
• Objective changes in benefits, which consist of 
changes in weekly benefit amounts or duration of 
benefits that can be evaluated using the actuarial 
procedures described in Appendix A.
• Utilization effect, which consists of a 10 percent 
increase in the objective changes in benefits, based 
on the assumption that higher statutory benefits 
induce workers to increase the frequency or dura-
tion of their claims.
• Subjective changes in benefits, which consist of 
the NCCI’s assessment of the effect of court deci-
sions or statutory changes (other than objective 
changes) on benefits paid. Examples of these subjec-
tive changes are given in the methodology section 
below.
The benefit level changes published in the ASB 
sometimes reflect the sum of the first two components, 
sometimes consist of only the third component, and 
sometimes combine all three. All of the expected-ben-
efits figures discussed in Appendix A consist solely 
of objective changes in benefits, which we estimated 
independently but used, to the best of our ability, the 
NCCI procedure.
16 http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy
Methodology for WCPD  
Compensability Rules
We offer two examples of the calculation of a com-
pensability rules value for a given state. The examples 
respectively describe an increase and a decrease in the 
compensability rules value. Table B-1 presents sup-
porting data.
Montana 1983. The first example involves an increase 
in the value of compensability rules variable. The 
court decision mentioned in Table B-1 is Wight v. 
Hughes Livestock Co. Inc., 664 P.2d 303 (Mont. 1983), 
which held that when an insurer denies compensability 
or partially denies benefits and is subsequently found 
liable for benefits or additional benefits, the insurer is 
liable for at least a portion of the applicant’s attorney’s 
fee. In a separate development, the maximum weekly 
benefit for PPD increased from $120.50 to $131.50 
and the maximum weekly benefits for PTD and TTD 
increased from $241.00 to $263.00 on July 1, 1983. 
(TTD benefits are paid to some workers who receive 
PPD benefits and thus affect the estimates of benefits 
paid for PPD claims.)
The weighted average of NCCI estimates of the 
effect of the 1983 Montana changes on PTD, major 
PPD, and minor PPD benefits paid is a 28.9 percent 
increase. This increase combines all three benefit 
change components: objective changes in benefits, the 
utilization effect, and subjective changes in benefits 
(the court decision).
We calculate the expected benefits for the work-
ers who received PTD benefits, major PPD benefits, 
and minor PPD benefits as of January 1, 1983, and 
January 1, 1984, using the procedure described 
in Appendix A. We first calculate the percentage 
increases in these three types of permanent disability 
benefits between January 1, 1983 and January 1, 1984. 
We then combine these percentage increases using 
the weights for the three types of permanent disability 
cases and estimate that permanent disability benefits 
in Montana increased by 3.1 percent during 1983. This 
increase is due solely to objective changes in benefits.
The WCPD compensability rules variable reflects 
the subjective changes in benefits. We use the term 
“subjective” because compensability rules values do 
not rely on a standardized actuarial procedure (such as 
that used by NCCI to estimate the objective changes in 
benefits) or a uniform adjustment (such as the 10 per-
cent utilization effect added to the objective changes). 
Instead, the compensability rules value represents an 
NCCI judgment about additional factors in a particular 
state that are likely to affect workers’ compensation 
benefit payments.
To calculate the compensability rules variable, we 
take the value of benefit level changes published in 
the ASB and subtract the values of both the objective 
changes in benefits and the utilization effect. Thus, 
the WCPD compensability rules value for Montana 
for 1983 is 28.9 percent (ASB value) minus 3.1 percent 
(our estimates of objective changes) minus 0.31 per-
cent (utilization effect) = 25.5 percent.
We assume that a change in the compensability 
rules value reflects a permanent change in the factors 
that affect workers’ compensation benefit payments in 
a state. We therefore created a data series for each state 
PTD Major PPD Minor PPD Explanation
26.9 26.9 26.9 Court decision
6.1 1.8 1.1 Increase in flexible maximum a
Total 33.0 28.7 28.0
1.0 0.3 0.3 Increase in flexible maximum a
-5.9 4.9 4.9 Legislation (S.B. 1197)
Total -4.9 5.2 5.2
a. The flexible maximum is a provision in the state's workers' compensation statute that increases or decreases the maximum weekly 
benefit in proportion to changes in the state's average weekly wage.
Oregon 1990
July 1
July 1
SOURCE: NCCI (1995, Exhibit III).
Montana 1983
Table B-1.
NCCI estimates of workers' compensation benefit level changes (in percent), by permanent injury type: 
Two examples
Date
July 1
May 16
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that begins in 1975 (the first year in our database for 
most workers’ compensation variables) with a compen-
sability rules value of 0. Any changes in the compen-
sability rules after 1975 accumulate. The 25.5 percent 
increase in the WCPD compensability rules for 
Montana in 1983 is equivalent to a 0.255 increase in 
the compensability rules value used in our regressions.
Oregon 1990. The second example involves a 
decrease in the compensability rules value. Table B-1 
refers to S.B. 1197, which provided that (1) claims were 
compensable under the Oregon workers’ compensation 
statute only if work was the “major cause” of the per-
manent disability or need for treatment—this is known 
as the major contributing cause requirement—and 
(2) the worker must provide medical evidence based 
on “objective findings” in order to establish compensa-
bility. Concurrent with these changes in the eligibility 
requirements for PPD benefits, Oregon increased the 
maximum weekly benefit for PPD from $145.00 to 
$305.00 and the maximum weekly benefits for PTD 
and TTD from $388.99 to $406.54 on July 1, 1990. (As 
in Montana, TTD benefits are paid to some workers 
who receive PPD benefits and thus affect the estimates 
of benefits paid for PPD claims.)
In calculating the WCPD compensability rules for 
Oregon, we follow the same steps as those described 
above for Montana. The weighted average of the NCCI 
estimates of the effects of the 1990 Oregon changes 
on PTD, major PPD, and minor PPD benefit payments 
is a 3.9 percent increase. We calculate the expected 
benefits as of January 1, 1990 and January 1, 1991 
using the procedure described in Appendix A. We 
then calculate the percentage increases in these three 
types of permanent disability benefits between Janu-
ary 1, 1990 and January 1, 1991. We combine these 
percentage increases using the weights for the three 
types of permanent disability cases and estimate that 
permanent disability benefits in Oregon increased by 
39 percent during 1990. This increase is solely due 
to objective changes in benefits and in particular, the 
more than doubling of the maximum weekly benefit 
for PPD benefits.
The WCPD compensability rules value for Oregon 
for 1990 is 3.9 percent (the ASB value) minus 39 per-
cent (our estimates of objective changes) minus 
3.9 percent (utilization effect) = -39.0 percent. The 
39.0 percent decrease in the WCPD compensabil-
ity rules for Oregon in 1990 is equivalent to a 0.39 
decline in the compensability rules value used in 
our regressions.
Compensability Rules Threshold
To avoid measurement errors, we treat an annual 
change in WCPD compensability rules as zero if the 
calculated value is less than 2 percent. One reason 
we use the 2 percent threshold is that we calculate 
expected benefits for every type of benefit for every 
state each January 1, while the NCCI calculates the 
changes in benefits only when the workers’ com-
pensation statute has changed or the courts make a 
significant decision. This means that for New York, we 
show an increase in PTD benefits every year between 
1994 and 1999 because the state average weekly wage, 
one of the determinants of expected PTD benefits, 
increased every year. By contrast, the NCCI reported 
0.0 percent increases in PTD benefits in New York for 
every year between 1994 and 1999. We do not consider 
the difference between our estimates of the change in 
expected benefits and the NCCI data on changes in 
benefits during this period in calculating the compen-
sability rules.
The Utilization Effect
As previously explained, we subtract the utilization 
effect (along with the objective changes in benefits) 
from the NCCI estimates of the changes in benefit 
levels published in the ASB to calculate the compensa-
bility rules. The evidence on the relationship between 
expected benefits and employers’ workers’ compen-
sation costs in the studies surveyed in Appendix A 
suggests that a utilization effect should not be used to 
estimate the total effects of changes in state laws on 
total benefits paid. Krueger and Burton (1990) could 
not reject the null hypothesis of a unitary elasticity 
between costs and benefits, and all other previous 
studies using expected benefits found that actual 
benefit payments did not increase proportionately with 
increases in expected benefits.
Previous Use of the Compensability  
Rules Variable
Guo and Burton (2008) study the determinants of DI 
applications per 100,000 persons in 45 jurisdictions 
from 1985 to 1999. In addition to expected benefits, 
the authors use compensability rules as another 
independent variable for the combination of four types 
of cash benefits, which is significant at the .01 level in 
both regressions explaining the DI application rates.
Guo and Burton (2010) examine the determinants 
of interstate differences in workers’ compensation 
cash benefits per 100,000 workers for each year from 
1975 to 1999 for up to 46 jurisdictions. In addition 
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to expected benefits, the authors use compensability 
rules as another independent variable for the combina-
tion of four types of cash benefits, which is significant 
at the .05 level in one regression and significant at the 
.01 level in the other regression explaining changes in 
incurred workers’ compensation cash benefits during 
the 1990s. Incurred workers’ compensation benefits 
per 100,000 workers declined by 41.6 percent in real 
terms between 1990 and 1999, and the decline in 
compensability rules accounted for 6.25 percent of the 
incurred benefit decline.
Notes
1 Although one might expect the DI acceptance ratio to 
be expressed as accepted DI claims divided by total appli-
cations, we divide acceptances by denials to avoid statisti-
cal biases. See note 9.
2 Workers’ compensation benefits are limited to persons 
whose disabilities are work-related, while DI pays benefits 
for both work- and nonwork-related disabilities. However, 
DI only pays benefits to permanently and totally disabled 
persons, while workers’ compensation programs provide 
benefits for both totally and partially disabled workers, 
for both temporary and permanent disabilities, and for 
fatalities.
3 The workers’ compensation program is elective for 
employers in Texas.
4 Accidental death and dismemberment insurance pro-
vides benefits if an accident results in an employee’s death 
or certain dismemberments enumerated in the insurance 
contract.
5 The type of offset in a state affects the employers’ 
incentives to encourage disabled workers to apply for DI 
benefits. Both DI and workers’ compensation are funded 
by payroll taxes. The DI tax (part of the Social Security 
payroll tax) is uniform for all employers. However, workers’ 
compensation premiums for large and medium employers 
who purchase insurance are linked to the cost of workers’ 
compensation benefits paid to the firms’ employees by 
“experience rating,” so that as benefit payments increase, so 
do the employers’ costs. Program costs and benefit pay-
ments to workers are also closely related for employers who 
self-insure. The link between benefits and costs provides 
an incentive for employers (or their insurance carriers) 
in reverse offset states to encourage their work-disabled 
employees to apply for DI benefits. Employers in states with 
the standard offset rule have less incentive to encourage 
their workers to apply for DI benefits, because DI awards do 
not lower workers’ compensation benefits and employers’ 
costs.
6 Research also indicates that the legislative changes 
in workers’ compensation eligibility rules may partially 
account for the recent decline in reported occupational 
injury rates (Boden and Ruser 2003).
7 DI beneficiaries can elect to receive old-age benefits 
instead of disability benefits beginning at age 62. Conver-
sion to old-age benefits occurs automatically when the 
beneficiary attains full retirement age.
8 We focus on PPD and PTD claims because they are 
more likely to result in applications for DI benefits than are 
TTD and fatality benefits.
9 Guo and Burton (2008) is the only study of DI appli-
cation rates in our survey that includes an independent 
variable that measures administrative stringency, namely 
DI acceptance rate (the proportion of applications that were 
approved), which had a negative coefficient. However, that 
estimate was biased because the numerator of the depen-
dent variable (DI applications per 100,000 persons) and the 
denominator of the independent variable (DI acceptances) 
were the same. To avoid that bias in this study, we use the 
ratio of DI acceptances to DI denials to measure adminis-
trative stringency.
10 We briefly summarize types of PPD benefits in Appen-
dix A; Burton (2005) discusses them in detail.
11 The earliest year with data by state for disability 
prevalence and the DI acceptance ratio (lagged 1 year) is 
1981. The latest year with data for expected WCPD benefits 
and WCPD compensability rules is 1999.
12 We do not have observations for WCPD compensabil-
ity rules in six states (Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and Wyoming), which had exclusive 
state workers’ compensation insurance funds during the 
study period.
13 To determine if the decline in sample size substantially 
changes our results, we repeated the regressions shown 
in Table 2 with the full sample of 969 observations. The 
pattern and magnitude of most variables are very similar in 
the two sets of regressions, and a Chow test comparing the 
coefficients found no significant differences. Thus, reduc-
ing sample size does not result in statistically significant 
changes in our results, indicating that our regressions using 
855 observations should be reliable.
14 We cannot include a dummy variable indicating which 
states have reverse offset rules (see note 5) because our pre-
ferred statistical approach—a fixed-effect model with state 
and year dummies—cannot include two dummy variables 
that are invariant in value over all years.
15 The standard deviation for expected WCPD benefits 
is 32.74 (Table 1). The difference in DI applications per 
100,000 nonelderly adults between states one standard 
deviation above and below the average is  
      32.74 × 2 × 0.51 = 33.39.
16 The standard deviation for WCPD compensability 
rules is 0.31 (Table 1). The difference in DI applications 
per 100,000 nonelderly adults between states one standard 
deviation above and below the average is  
      0.31 × 2 × 30.95 = 19.19.
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17 The 2012 report of the Social Security Trust Funds 
states, “the DI Trust Fund fails the Trustees’ short-term test 
of financial adequacy. The Trustees project that the DI trust 
fund ratio will fall below 100 percent by the beginning of 
2013. After 2013, the projected DI trust fund ratio continues 
to decline until the trust fund is exhausted in 2016” (Board 
of Trustees 2012, 9).
18 Burton (2009) provides an extended discussion of the 
effects of workers’ compensation on safety, such as the 
relationship between risk premiums included in the wages 
of workers in unsafe firms and workers’ compensation pre-
miums. He also examines the moral hazard resulting from 
workers’ compensation’s effective reduction in adverse 
consequences for the employer.
19 Burkhauser and Daly (2011, 109–113) propose experi-
ence rating for DI.
20 Between the 1980s and 1990s, the weighted national 
average of expected WCPD benefits declined by 5.4 percent 
(Table 4), and the unweighted average declined by 8.7 per-
cent (not shown). Likewise, the weighted national average 
of WCPD compensability rules declined by 4 percentage 
points and the unweighted national average declined by 
8 percentage points during the period.
21 Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001, Appendix 
D) and Thomason and Burton (2004, 75–84) describe the 
methodology in detail.
22 Burton (2005, 88–95) identifies six distinct systems of 
PPD benefits used in various states.
23 Fratello (1955) details the basic procedure. 
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